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"As Near as May Be Agreeable to the
Laws of this Kingdom": Legal
Birthright and Legal Baggage at
Chebucto, 1749
Thomas Garden Barnes*
The Old British Empire at its greatest extent and the height of its
grandeur, between 1763 and 1776, comprised thirty-three colonies, all
but a few of them in North America and the Caribbean, none of them
older than 1607. The most recently acquired colonies included the
largest, Canada, and some of the smallest, Grenada and St. Vincent.1
The Empire was not a monolith. Differing geography, history,
economics, social structure and dynamics, and ethnicity produced
political societies of great variations and disparities, even between
contiguous colonies. Historians of the Old Empire have found general-
ization difficult and dangerous, save when describing "imperial policy"
(such as it was). The adjectives applied to the colonies as entities are
preponderantly "unique, sui generis, extraordinary, remarkable,
singular." Consequently, a claim for the remarkableness of any one
colony seems supererogatory if not superfluous. Yet one colony stood
out rather more than all the rest, marked by distinctions that were truly
singular in comparison with the other major-and older-colonies, and
in some instances unique in Britain's previous colonial experience. Nova
Scotia was one of only five major colonies acquired by conquest from
European powers. It bore little resemblance to any other colony, though
historians often categorize it with Georgia (which was not acquired by
conquest) because of the strategic importance of both. Georgia had been
founded at crown expense under trustees as an asylum for debtors and
as a barrier to Spanish Florida. But Nova Scotia was not set up by
proprietary or corporation grant, motive for its settlement was neither
commerce nor asylum, and it was colonized rapidly at the sole expense
of the King in Parliament. Nova Scotia was literally an act of state. A
Crown colony settled in 1749 by an initial draft of some 2,600 colonists,
* Thomas G. Barnes, D.Phil., is Professor of History and Law and Co-Chairman of the
Canadian Studies Program, University of California, Berkeley.
1. Canada, or New France, including most of present-day Ontario and Quebec as well as
the Old (Transappalachian) Northwest, ceded by France in the Treaty of Paris, 1763,
comprised about one million sq.mi.; Grenada (120 sq.mi.) and St. Vincent (133 sq.mi.)
were ceded by the same treaty.
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of whom just over one-half of the male heads-of-household were ex-
naval and -army officers and men, 2 the settlement was made possible by
sizable parliamentary grants that supplied every material need of the
colony during the early years of its existence. And the object of the
settlement was entirely strategic: to deny French reconquest of Nova
Scotia and to provide a counterpoise to and base of operations against
the French citadel at Louisburg. Indeed, Nova Scotia was virtually a
prototype of colonialization in the first half century of the New British
Empire (1800-1850), raised, not quite in a "fit of absentmindedness," on
the ruins of the Old Empire after the defection of thirteen of the
American colonies and under the strategic exigencies of trade protection
in the age of steam.
The crown, in the Lord Commissioners for Trade and Plantations
and its personna at Chebucto, Colonel the Honourable Edward
Cornwallis, captain general and governor in chief of Nova Scotia or
Acadia, had a clean slate upon which to begin. Since 1710, Acadia (less
Cape Breton Island) had been in British hands. The small garrison and
diminutive administration at Annapolis Royal was strictly a holding
operation, maintaining a British presence and little more for almost four
decades, ignored if not forgotten, latterly with an absentee governor,
administered by an aging resident lieutenant governor, Lt. Col. John
Paul Mascarene, who had been one of the conquerors of Port Royal in
1710. British presence depended heavily upon sporadic and niggardly
support from Massachusetts in time of peril and a conciliatory detente
between Annapolis Royal and the Acadians around Minas and the
Micmacs everywhere in time of peace. 3 Mascarene's services were
remarkable, if little appreciated by Cornwallis, who wrote of him to the
Board of Trade in 1750 that he was worn out and had sold out.4 Un-
happily, there was a great deal of truth in the first stricture, and, from the
vantage point of the vigorous new administration at Chebucto,
Mascarene's toleration of Acadian neutralism and passive resistance to
the oath of allegiance appeared craven.
A recent work of very revisionist, albeit stimulating, scholarship on
the Old British Empire urges us to jettison Charles McLean Andrews'
construct of imperial policy to 1763 as being essentially mercantilistic
and non-militaristic. Stephen Saunders Webb, in The Governors-
General: The English Army and the Definition of the Empire,
1569-1681, the first of a multivolume series which will treat the entire
Old Empire, proclaims, "It is the intent of this book to establish that,
2. T. Akins, Selections from the Public Documents of the Province of Nova Scotia
(Halifax, 1869), pp. 506-557 [hereinafter Akins]: list of settlers who came with
Governor Cornwallis to Chebucto, June 1749.
3. G. Rawlyk, Nova Scotia's Massachusetts: A Study of Massachusetts-Nova Scotia
Relations, 1630 to 1784 (Montreal, 1973), chapters 7-10.
4. B. Murdoch, A History of Nova-Scotia, Or Acadie, vol. 2 (Halifax, 1867), p. 188.
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from the beginning, English colonization was at least as much military
as it was commercial."5 The social policy of the imperialists, created by
military officers commanding the colonies as governors general, was
agrarian, authoritarian, and paramilitary. Obviously Colonel Corn-
wallis' Chebucto settlement should fit Webb's model, and we are not
surprised to find that, by the time he reaches the end of the period
covered in this volume, Nova Scotia has a niche:
Regular troops in three New York garrisons, and garrisons in Nova
Scotia and Newfoundland, from 1696 until the eve of the Revolu-
tion, organized soldier-colonies on the Roman model. Such units
manifested the army's social, political, and profoundly imperial
influence in colonial America.6
Perhaps it is premature to tackle Webb's contention. Clearly, his refer-
ence to Nova Scotia foreshadows fuller treatment in a subsequent
volume. But the thrust of his argument is clear enough, and, given the
singularity of the Nova Scotia experience, its prototypical nature from
Andrews' viewpoint, its purely typical nature from Webb's, there might
be some merit in determining early on how well Nova Scotia fits the
"new model" Old Empire, how closely Cornwallis came up to the mark
of Lucius Cornelius Sulla.
7
Superficially, at least, Nova Scotia was just such a paramilitary
colony. Its foundation was to strategic ends, half its original heads-of-
household were disciplined veterans, its first three governors (from 1749
to 1760) were British colonels in the establishment list,8 and Halifax
would long bristle with a relatively formidable garrison of regular
soldiers from the arrival in 1749 of Colonel Hopson's troops evacuated
from Louisburg under treaty terms.
Profoundly, however, the record of the settlement's early years
5. S. Webb, The Governors-General: The English Army and the Definition of the
Empire, 1569-1681 (Chapel Hill, 1979), p. xvi [hereinafter Webb].
6. Webb, supra, note 5, p. 453. Webb appears to rely heavily on R.H.R. Smythies, His-
torical Records of the 40th (2nd Somersetshire) Regiment (Devonport, 1894) for the
role of the military in Nova Scotia, which is not entirely up to bearing the weight of his
interpretation.
7. Sulla (138-78 B.C.) was the Roman quaestor, praetor, consul-dictator-who
originated the Roman system of military colonies throughout Italy.
8. Edward Cornwallis (1749-1752); Thomas Peregrine Hopson (1752-1756); Charles
Lawrence, president of council vice Hopson (1753), lieutenant governor (1754),
governor (1756-1760), were colonels. Robert Monckton, lieutenant-governor vice
Lawrence (1756-1759), was a lieutenant colonel. Henry Ellis, governor, (1761-1763),
was not a military man but an hydrographer and Fellow of the Royal Society. The
indefatigable Edward How, who for some three decades had played a major role in
defusing Acadian and Indian crises along the Fundy, was considered unfit by
Cornwallis to be lieutenant governor because he was not a military man: G. Bates,
"Your Most Obedient Humble Servant, Edward How" (1961), 33 Collections of the
Nova Scotia Historical Society I at 18.
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indicates how slight was the paramilitary aspect of the colony and how
un-Sulla-like was Colonel Cornwallis. Cornwallis and his entourage
arrived on 21 June; by 1 July all of the transports had arrived. The
governor met his council for the first time on 14 July, opened his com-
mission and swore in the six initial councillors. Four days later, four
justices of the peace were appointed and sworn in. Two were military
men, Lieutenant Robert Ewer, late of Frazer's Regiment, and retired
Lieutenant John Collier, but two were civilians, John Brewse, a civil
engineer, and John Duport, gent., an attorney-at-law. 9 On 19 July, the
settlers were assembled in separate companies with their respective
overseers to choose a constable for each company.' 0 Less than a week
later, Cornwallis sent to the Board of Trade the plan for the new town of
Halifax and its defence perimeter prepared by Brewse, and by the end of
the third week of August Brewse and the various overseers had assigned
the settlers their lots."
All this constituted the energetic travail of setting up essential civil
polity and preparing in a timely way for shelter against winter. But the
real measure of paramilitary organization was its capacity for defence. If
Colonel Cornwallis had any illusions on this score, they were soon
banished. The council agreed that, before the settlers built upon their
lots, the overseers would "propose" that they throw up a defence line, for
which each man would be paid Is. 6d. per diem.' 2 How un-martial the
old-soldier-and-sailor colonii were had to be confessed ruefully by
Cornwallis to the Duke of Bedford in early September. While the
regular troops-Hopson's men-were busy erecting the palisade, the
settlers were raising their own roofs and Cornwallis further marvelling
that, while the French were stirring up the Indians, "The Settlers don't
seem at all alarmed."' 13 Cornwallis was. Despite considerable satisfac-
tion with the assurances of the deputies from the Acadians, with whom
he had met in the first month after his arrival, he did not trust the Indians
despite the treaty entered into by them in mid-August.The first blow fell
on 30 September, when four unarmed workmen were killed and a fifth
carried off by the Micmac at Major Jarman's sawmill on the harbour. 14
The response of the governor and council was modest (so far as
mobilizing the colony was concerned): annoy, distress, take, and destroy
the Indians, with IOgns. for each Indian or his scalp "(as is the custom of
9. Akins, supra, note 2, p. 571. For Ewer, see Akins, p. 509; Collier, p. 255; Brewse, p.
556; Duport, pp. 553, 694.
10. Akins, id., p. 571.
11. Id., pp. 565, 577.
12. Id., p. 572.
13. Id., pp. 585-586. Cornwallis wrote Bedford on 20 August 1749 that there was "no
persuading" the settlers to erect defence works before starting to build their own
houses: Akins, p. 577.
14. Akins, id., p. 582.
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America) if killed." 5 No move was made to arm the populace, beyond
the disposition a fortnight before for arming ordnance artificers, New
Englanders, and those settlers who had been in the army-no more than
two hundred in all-the council having held then that it "would be very
improper to arm all the Settlers."' 6 Indeed, it was not until 6 December
that the governor and council ordered all able men between sixteen and
sixty to assemble by the town's quarters to be formed into a militia.'
7
Ten days later, the governor and council decided to pay the settlers to
clear woods around the lines to open a field of fire. '8 On 7 January 1750,
the council rejected "a petition from some of the Inhabitants" asking
that martial law be put into effect during the Indian danger; instead,
under pain of imprisonment for twenty-four hours and a fine of 5
shillings, militiamen were ordered to stand a night guard in every
quarter of the town, and the settlers were ordered to "work a few days to
throw up some necessary Works."' 9 The result of these alarums and
excursions? On 19 March, Cornwallis wrote the Board of Trade that he
was obliged to employ all the hands he could get to raise the barricade to
the water's edge, but could not prevail upon the settlers to cut out the
field of fire. "It has been always impossible to get any of them to work
without great wages"; and though "The Officers [of the militia] behaved
well; I cannot commend the behaviour of the men in general notwith-
standing the danger they imagined threatened them. '20 Augustan
Britons were not Augustan Romans, evidently. Then, Augustan Britons
had undoubted rights and liberties accorded them by the Law and the
Constitution.
I do not mean to belabour this point (or Professor Webb). For all
the drum-and-trumpet obbligato to the more humdrum melody of daily
life in early Chebucto, the colony was essentially a civil-and civilian-
polity. Englishmen's suspicion of a standing army had not diminished in
the three-quarters of a century since James II had bivouacked an army
on Hounslow Heath. The annual Mutiny Act was not primarily a means
to assure the survival of Parliament; it was a device to maintain parlia-
mentary and civilian control of the army. Britons had come to be able to
live with an army, but a little one-much of it quickly paid off when the
shooting stopped and the rest of it grossly neglected-which relied on
foreign mercenaries for expansion in time of war. It was officered by
gentlemen who did not conceive of themselves as a distinct caste or as
15. Id., p. 582.
16. Id., p. 580.
17. Id., p. 596.
18. Id., p. 597.
19. Id., pp. 598-599. The governor and council doubtless welcomed the petition request-
ing martial law for its value in terrorem-it at least gave credence to their sense of
urgency in erecting defences.
20. Akins, id., p. 605.
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men whose interests were distinguishable from those of their civilian
brothers on the county bench and in the country house. The civilian
mentality ran deep. A paid-offtrooper or a half-pay officer reverted very
easily, sometimes too easily as Haligonians for almost a century knew all
too well, to civilian status, civilian pursuits, and civilian laxity.
When it came to recruiting settlers for Chebucto, the Board of
Trade in its advertisement of 7 March 1749 not only promised transpor-
tation, land, tools and utensils, building materials, arms for defence, a
year's maintenance in the colony, security, and protection, but also that
there would be a
civil government established, whereby they will enjoy all the
liberties, privileges and immunities enjoyed by His Majesty's
subjects in any other of the Colonies and Plantations in America,
under His Majesty's Government . .2
The new governor's commission gave him power to establish the
accepted institutions of civil government: a council, a legislative
assembly, courts, and a judiciary. It accorded him the power of the civil
executive to defend the colony, exercize the king's prerogative of mercy,
administer public funds, make grants and assurances of lands, and
establish fairs and markets. Most significantly, Cornwallis' commission,
tested 6 May 1749, gave authority to the governor "with the advice and
consent of our said Council and Assembly or the Major part of them
respectively . . ." in Nova Scotia
to make, constitute and ordain Laws, Statutes & Ordinances for the
Publick peace, welfare & good government of our said province
and of the people and inhabitants thereof and such others as shall
resort thereto & for the benefit of us our heirs & Successors, which
said Laws, Statutes and Ordinances are not to be repugnant but as
near as may be agreeable to the Laws and Statutes of this our
Kingdom of Great Britain.
22
The last clause, as to non-repugnancy and agreeableness to the laws
of England, had a long history behind it. And it was a history that
included the province of Acadia for three decades before Cornwallis and
his colonists arrived at Chebucto. After seven years of essentially
military rule following the capture of Port Royal in 1710-under those
two rigorous warriors, Samuel Vetch and Francis Nicholson, who took
the fort-British Acadia came under the governorship of Col. Richard
Philipps in 1717.23 And there it remained for thirty-two years of increas-
21. Id., p. 496.
22. Id., p. 500.
23. Vetch was governor 1610-1612 and 1615-1617; Nicholson, 1612-1615. See S. Webb,
"The Strange Career of Francis Nicholson" (October 1966), 23 William & Mary
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ing neglect and, after the first four years, the continuous absence of the
governor. The Board of Trade was hardly less soporific with respect to
the province. In 1719 it finally got around to issuing instructions to
Philipps that hinted at the creation of a regular civil government on
what was the already accepted pattern for Britain's colonies, with a
legislative assembly to make laws, but directed him in the meantime to
follow the 1715 instructions to the Earl of Orkney as governor of
Virginia.24 Clause 62 of the Virginia instructions read:
You are to take Care that no Man's Life Member freehold or Goods
be taken away or harm'd in our said Colony otherwise than by
establish'd and known Laws, not repugnant but as near as may be
agreeable to the Laws of this Kingdom. 25
Virtually the same provision had been contained in the January 1682
instructions to Gov. Thomas Lord Culpepper of Virginia.
26
The non-repugnance and agreeableness clause in colonial enabling
instruments originated in the 1632 charter to Lord Baltimore for
Maryland, which directed that the laws made by colonial legislative
authority were to be "inviolably observed" under penalties,
So, nevertheless, that the Laws aforesaid be consonant to Reason,
and be not repugnant or contrary, but (so far as conveniently may
be) agreeable to the Laws, Statutes, Customs, and Rights of this
Our Kingdom of England.2 7
In this point, so close are the instructions to Cornwallis to the provisions
in the 1632 Maryland charter, it is reasonable to suppose that, if the
latter was not the immediate parent of the former, it was the remote
ancestor.
Obviously the 1749 instruction (and the Maryland provision of
1632) differ significantly in two ways from the Virginia instructions of
1682 and 1715. First, the Virginia instructions applied the standard of
non-repugnancy and agreeableness only to criminal prosecutions
touching life and limb (i.e., felonies) and civil actions involving lands
and tenements, goods and chattels. It was a procedural standard direct-
ing the maintenance of substantive probity in laws that had developed in
an old colony with a considerable legislative history. The 1749 instruc-
tion to Cornwallis was a substantive standard to be applied to the entire
corpus of law yet to be made in a new colony. If nothing else, that quality
Quarterly 513; Nicholson certainly was a latter-day Sulla and fits Webb's thesis
perfectly, perhaps too perfectly.
24. L. Labaree, Royal Instructions to British Colonial Governors, 1670-1776, vol. 1
(Washington, 1935) §136 [hereinafter Labaree].
25. (1913), 21 Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 288 [hereinafter VMHB].
26. (1919), 27 VMHB 329.
27. R. Perry, ed., Sources of Our Liberties (New York, 1972), p. 108.
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of innovation would have recommended the Maryland model for the
Nova Scotian situation. Moreover, Virginia's charters and instructions
were silent on non-repugnancy and agreeableness of the whole corpus of
colonial law to the laws of the mother country.' Secondly, because the
Virginia instructions sounded in procedure, not substantive law, they
did not make the distinction between common law rules judicially
derived and statutory enactments, which was evidenced in the 1749
instruction requiring agreeableness to "the Laws and Statutes" of
Britain. The distinction was important in the eighteenth century. It not
only bedeviled English law for some two centuries (especially in matters
of law reform, codification, etc.), it also contributed mightily to
contemporary confusion in the mother country and the colonies as to
what English laws were and were not in force in the colonies. The
confusion was compounded by the distinction made by lawyers between
statutes affirming, amending, or extending common law and statutes
making entirely new law. In short, the difference between common law
and statute law went a long ways towards preventing the emergence of
any uniform doctrine of "reception." The want of such a uniform
doctrine repeatedly presented difficulties to the colonies, including
Nova Scotia, until a century or more of judicial and legislative activity
and the emergence of responsible government made the issues moot.
For the thirteen colonies which launched out on a bold new experiment
in 1776, the lack of a uniform doctrine of reception continued to plague
them as states within a federal union, resulting in a great deal more
diversity in laws than even state sovereignty demanded. But that is not
our concern here.
What law was "received" in Nova Scotia, what were the "liberties,
privileges, and immunities" the new colonists were to enjoy according to
the promise of the Board of Trade and Plantations? Both technically in
law and practically in application the answer to that question is difficult
to discover now and was even more difficult to determine then.
Contemporaries well understood that what English law was deemed to
be in force in a colony depended upon (1) whether thelaw was statute or
common law; and (2) how and under what circumstances the colony in
question was acquired. In short, reception of the law of the mother
country turned, in the first instance, upon a question of law and, in the
second instance, upon a question of fact.
To begin with the question of law, which was simpler and less
subject to dispute, we turn to the statutory authority which, from its
enactment until its obsolescence under the force of political change and
final interment as dead law in 1867, governed the applicability of
English statute law to the colonies. This was the 1696 Act for Preventing
Frauds and Regulating Abuses in the Plantation Trade, 7&8 Will 3, c. 22,
which sought to put teeth into the implementation of the Navigation
Acts by penalties on those engaged in colonial trade in breach of the
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Acts and on colonial officials from wharfingers to governors for mal-
feasance and misfeasance in implementing the Acts, and by creating
machinery for the better enforcement of the Acts. To prevent the inter-
ference of colonial laws with the implementation of the Navigation Acts,
the statute declared null and void all "Laws, By laws, Usages or
Customs" of the colonies "repugnant" to the Acts; but it went a step
further, declaring null and void colonial "Laws [etc.]' repugnant "to any
other Law hereafter to be made in this Kingdom, so far as such Law shall
relate to and mention the said Plantations... -"28 Clearly, the statutory
legislation of the mother country was binding upon a colony if the
legislation explicitly declared it to be applicable to the colony or to all
the colonies. If the legislation was silent as to its applicability to the
colonies, then it did not apply to them.
What of the old statute law of England, the Acts passed before
1696 that did not explicitly mention the colonies? The 1696 Act was not
retroactive save in the case of the Navigation Acts enumerated in it
(which mentioned the colonies anyway). On the face of it, an Act of
Parliament before 1696 applied to a colony if the colony was in existence
before 1696. However, whether or not an earlier Act applied depended
upon the answer to a question of fact: Was the colony a territory
acquired by conquest, or was it the plantation of an uninhabited
territory?
The legal development of this distinction was slight and fraught
with constitutional import. It has been well-plowed by scholarship.2 9 It
began-as so much early English constitutional law did-with Sir
Edward Coke in the early seventeenth century. It culminated-as so
much early English constitutional law did-with Lord Mansfield in the
later eighteenth century. In Calvin's Case, or the Case of the Post-Nati,
in Exchequer Chamber in 1608, an essential element in the opinion of
Chief Justice Coke as to why a Scot born after the union of the English
and Scottish crowns was as well an English as a Scottish subject of the
king turned on the historical distinction between the king's realm and
the king's dominions not part of his realm but under his obedience. The
king within his realm was, like his subjects, bound by the laws of the
realm. However, if a dominion not part of the realm was acquired by the
king by conquest, then the king could introduce into it such law as he
deemed fit. The conquered people were at his mercy; his power over
them absolute, the power of life and death. If the conquered dominion
was a Christian kingdom, its pre-conquest laws remained in force until
28. 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 22, s. 9. This Act was repealed, along with a great many other statutes
deemed archaic, by The Statute Law Revision Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Viet., C. 59, by the
same Parliament which passed The British North America Act, 1867, (c. 3)-
coincidental irony!
29. Most notably and persuasively by the late Joseph H. Smith in Appeals to the Privy
Council from the American Plantations (New York, 1950), pp. 464-522.
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the king altered them. If the conquered dominion was infidel, its pre-
conquest laws were abrogated at the moment of conquest. In the case of
a Christian country, if the king introduced the laws of England, then his
successors could not alter those laws without "parliament." Coke's
example was Ireland, and it is likely that by "parliament" he intended
the Irish, not the English, Parliament.
30
Whatever Coke's meaning in 1608, the subsequent and authori-
tative interpretation placed upon the term "parliament" was that the
king's plentitude of prerogative power to give law to dominions not part
of the realm was subject to the constitutional restraint; his legislative
authority was exercisable only through the imperial Parliament or, once
he had extended English law to a colony, its colonial legislature. He
could not change the law of the colony otherwise than by Act of the
imperial Parliament or of the colonial legislature. This was the emphatic
judgment of Chief Justice Mansfield in King's Bench in 1774 in
Campbell v. Hall. Summing up existing case law from Calvin's Case
onwards in a series of six propositions, Mansfield's last proposition was
that if the King (and when I say the King, I always mean the King
without the concurrence of Parliament,) has a power to alter the old
law and to introduce new laws in a conquered country, this legis-
lation being subordinate, that is, subordinate to his own authority
in Parliament, he cannot make any new change contrary to funda-
mental principles: he cannot exempt an inhabitant from that
particular dominion; as for instance, from the laws of trade, or
from the power of Parliament, or give him privileges exclusive of
his other subjects; and so in many other instances which might be
put.3 1
Therefore, when the king conquered Grenada from the French in 1762
and was confirmed in his conquest by the peace treaty between France
and Britain of February 1763, he was free to give such law as he willed to
the colony. But by proclamation of 7 October 1763, the king had
promised to extend to a governor, council and assembly in the new
colony power to make laws for the colony "as near as may be agreeable
to the laws of England" as in other colonies; and on 9 April 1764, by
letters patent the king had issued commission to a governor to so
summon an assembly as soon as circumstances permitted. Conse-
quently, the king "had immediately and irrecoverably granted to all who
were or should become inhabitants [etc.]" of Grenada that "the
subordinate legislation over the island" should be exercized by a
30. 7 Co. Rep. 17b; J.H. Kettner, The Development ofAmerican Citizenship, 1608-1870
(Chapel Hill, 1978), pp. 16-28 at 25, concludes that "parliament" meant the Irish
parliament. I am grateful to Professor Kettner, my colleague, for having carefully read
and criticized this paper, much to my benefit and its improvement.
31. 1 Cowp. 204 at 209 [98 E.R. 1045 at 1048]; see also Lofft 655 [98 E.R. 848].
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governor, council, and assembly as in other colonies, and therefore the
king no longer had power to impose a customs duty on Grenada by his
prerogative expressed in letters patent of 20 July 1764.32 The window of
prerogative in a colony acquired by conquest from a Christian (a Most
Christian) king was very small indeed by 1774, a matter of a few months
in the case in hand.
Seen from either end of the development, from the alpha or the
omega, Calvin or Campbell, there emerges a clear line of doctrine. By
conquest the king could impose what law he wished, but, once having
imposed English law, he was bound by the constitutional restraints of
English law. Between 1608 and 1774, those constitutional restraints had
increased and the king's prerogative decreased and yet had not
disappeared.
Intervening between Calvin and Campbell were a handful of
judicial pronouncements and one quasi-judicial one which would have
excluded the king's prerogative entirely-or rather, it might be more
correct to say, have reduced it to a strict co-extensiveness with his
prerogative in England. These decisions also created a line of doctrine of
sorts: the "birthright" theory. Since Englishmen were born under the full
panoply of English law, common law and statute, they carried this law
with them wherever they went; wherever they went, provided it was not
to a conquered territory, for there the law was such as the king willed.
But if the English settlers founded a plantation in an uninhabited
territory acquired merely by first-possession rather than conquest, then
that plantation-founded colony "received" the entire law of England as
it existed at the moment of settlement.
The "birthright" theory was conceived by Chief Justice John
Vaughan of the Common Pleas in Craw v. Ramsey (1670), it was born
by Chief Justice John Holt of King's Bench in Blankardv. Galdy (1693),
studiously ignored by the House of Lords in Dutton v. Howell (1693),
well thrashed but not murdered by Holt in Smith v. Brown and Cooper
(1705), and finally thoroughly weaned from childish rebelliousness by
the Privy Council in 1722. For reasons that bore no relationship to
reality but probably grew from Vaughan's unwillingness to contradict
the luminous Coke (a reluctance characteristic of all Stuart judges),
Vaughan in Craw posited English settlement in lands utterly devoid of
inhabitants, such settlements being therefore plantations in territory not
acquired by conquest. In a confused opinion, full of future mischief, he
argued that the courts of such plantations were subject to the same
remedial writs, particularly error, to the King's Bench and the House of
Lords as was any other court in the realm of England.33 A quarter
century later, in Blankard, Chief Justice Holt (per curiam) is reported to
32. 1 Cowp. 204 at 213 [98 E.R. 1045 at 10503.
33. Vaugh. 274 [124 E.R. 1072].
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have held that "In case of an uninhabited country newly found out by
English subjects, all the laws in force in England are in force there;..."
but went on to find that the colony in the case in hand, Jamaica, had
been conquered, and therefore the laws of England did not "take place
there, until declared so by the conqueror or his successors. ' '34 A few
months later, in Dutton, the House of Lords was moved in error from
Exchequer Chamber in the matter of a scirefacias for damages for false
imprisonment awarded a former deputy governor of Barbados against
Dutton, the governor who, with his council, had committed the deputy
to jail awaiting trial. The counsel for the deputy's executors argued that
all the laws of England were in force in the Barbados because it was a
plantation, not a conquest, being "not inhabited by any, but overgrown
with Woods," and that such imprisonment by the colonial council was
illegal by English law. The unlearned Lords refused to deal with the
fundamental issue of reception and found against the deputy's executors
on the narrow grounds that in England the Council had power to
commit and that the colonial council, being also a council of state, must
have the power to commit awaiting trial before a competent court.35 In
Smith (1705) in an assumpsit for a Virginia slave sold in England, Chief
Justice Holt gave the plaintiff leave to amend his declaration so that it
would aver that the sale was in Virginia, because "as soon as a negro
comes into England, he becomes free, . . ." whereas by the laws of
Virginia Negroes are saleable, "for the laws of England do not extend to
Virginia, being a conquered country their law is what the King
pleases... "36 We might suppose that Holt, C.J. had come to regret his
indiscretion of a decade before in Blankard; the "birthright" theory
made reception an unwieldy sword for the protection of the rights and
liberties of Englishmen overseas and a two-edged sword which might be
turned to slash those very liberties in England by introducing such an
odious institution as chattel slavery.
In 1722 the Privy Council in the exercise of its ordinary jurisdiction
under the prerogative of hearing appeals from the colonies apparently
made a clear statement in a case from the Barbados of the distinction
between plantation and conquest. In the latter two of three proposi-
tions, the Council summed up the Cokeian doctrine of conquest,
without adding to it and without Coke's stricture, that once the king
introduced the laws of England into a conquered Christian country he
could not alter those laws save by "parliament." The first proposition is
the most arresting:
That if there be a new and uninhabited country found out by
English subjects, as the law is the birthright of every subject, so,
34. 2 Salk. 411 at 411 [91 E.R. 356 at 357].
35. Shower 24 at 31, 34-35 [1 E.R. 17 at 19, 23-24].
36. 2 Salk. 666 at 666 [91 E.R. 566 at 566].
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wherever they go, they carry their laws with them, and therefore
such new found country is to be governed by the laws of England;
though, after such country is inhabited by the English, acts of
parliament made in England, without naming the foreign planta-
tions, will not bind them; for which reason, it has been determined
that the statute of frauds and perjuries, which requires three
witnesses, and that these should subscribe in the testator's presence,
in the case of a devise in land, does not bind Barbadoes.37
Barbados was planted in 1626; therefore no English statutes not
explicitly naming the colonies were in effect there after that date. But
what of common law? Conceivably the law made by English courts of
record of superior jurisdiction after 1626, being part of the Englishman's
"birthright," would still be the law of Barbados. This was at least
arguable, but the reports of English cases are silent on the point.
Moreover, applying the 1722 resolution of the Privy Council to all the
plantation-founded colonies introduced a considerable disparity into
their settlers' "birthright": what statute law was in effect varied from
colony to colony depending upon the date of the colony's plantation.
Two circumstances reduced the effect of the "birthright" theory
both as a source of liberties and as a vehicle for introducing unnecessary
complexity in reception. First of all, there were very few plantations of
uninhabited territories. Blackstone pointed out in 1765 that "Our
American plantations are principally of this latter sort [conquest], being
obtained in the last century either by right of conquest and driving out
the natives (with what natural justice I shall not at present enquire) or by
treaties. '38 Barbados, if we accept the 1722 resolution, clearly was
plantation-founded. In that same year the law officers were not sure
whether Jamaica was or was not plantation-founded or by conquest, but
in 1774 Chief Justice Mansfield was convinced that it was plantation-
founded, "all the Spaniards having left the island or been driven out" as
the English arrived!3 9 The barren rock of St. Helena and, surprisingly,
the Isle St. Jean-which we know as Prince Edward Island-were
plantations, in the opinion of the attorney general in 1774. This mixed
bag, largely culled from obiter in Campbell v. Hall, points to the second,
and more important, circumstance which reduced the "birthright"
theory to negligible practical importance.
Mansfield's judgment in Campbell affirmed as principle what had
long since become the practice of British imperialism: Early in the life of
a new colony, whether acquired by conquest or plantation of an
uninhabited territory, the king granted to the colony the authority to
37. Anon., 2 P.Wms. 75 at 75 [24 E.R. 646 at 646]. The Statute of F rauds was 29 Car. 2,
c. 3 (1677).
38. William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, voL 1 (1765), p. 105.
39. Campbell v. Hall, I Cowp. 204 at 212 [98 E.R. 1045 at 1049].
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make its own laws, provided they were not repugnant to the laws of
England and as agreeable to them as local conditions permitted.
Campbell settled that such a grant, perhaps merely the solemn promise
of such a grant, of legislative authority was irrevocable by the king
alone; throughout the eighteenth century, however, political reality
suggested how slight was the peril of a wholesale revocation of colonial
laws by prerogative act. What could be done by prerogative was to
assure on a case-by-case and statute-by-statute basis that colonial law
was non-repugnant and agreeable to the law of the mother country. By
the same grant of legislative authority the king gave power to his
governor to erect courts of record to do justice and to implement the
laws of the colony. But the laws made by the colonial legislature were
reviewable by the King in Council to ensure non-repugnancy and agree-
ableness to the laws of England and subject to nullification if they were
repugnant; and the King in Council reserved power to hear appeals in
error to the judgments of colonial courts. These were considerable
powers but in practice bore less heavily on the colonies' initiative in
legislation and judicial action than we might suppose from the few, well-
documented, worst-case incidents of nullification and appellate
reversals, especially in New England in the early eighteenth century. The
creation of colonial courts and colonial legislatures, subject to the
uneven surveillance of the King in Council but immune to routine
review by the courts of the mother country, gave practical effect to the
theory that English law was the subject's "birthright," without regard to
how the colony was acquired. Each colony essayed a new experience in
the law, able because of its considerable legislative and judicial
autonomy to receive so much or so little of the law of England as was
appropriate to its domestic (although, not its imperial) circumstances.
In practice, reception as a source of uncertainty and complexity in the
law of the colony was rapidly vitiated by the individual colony's growing
corpus of statutory enactments and records of the judicial determina-
tions of its courts. What legal "birthright" the first colonists brought
with them rapidly became mere legal baggage, like old clothes to be
worn if they still fitted, retailored if woven of sound stuff, or discarded if
useless.
And so it would be for the first colonists and their successors at
Chebucto in 1749 and after. There was no doubt that Nova Scotia was a
colony acquired by conquest confirmed by treaty. The conquest was
already four decades past, the treaty struck in 1713, by the time
Governor Cornwallis opened his commission. Between 1710 and 1749
the conquered province of Acadia languished in that kind of limbo that
came right out of Calvin's Case. The conquered subjects of the van-
quished and expelled Christian King, absent the imposition of what law
the victorious British king willed to be imposed upon them, remained
subject to the precedent law in effect in Acadia before 1710. The only
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exception was the law of allegiance. Their new sovereign, by his agent in
Annapolis Royal, sought to impose upon the Acadians the English law
of allegiance in the form of an unconditional oath of allegiance. The
Acadians' refusal to take such an unconditional oath led in 1755 to one
of the most unhappy episodes in the history of the Old British Empire.
However, by then the king had imposed the law of his will in the com-
mission to Governor Cornwallis. Henceforth Nova Scotia would be
subject to the law characteristic of that of the British king's other
colonies in North America. In the process, the anomalous situation of
the handful of natural British subjects at Annapolis Royal, who for four
decades had struggled to evolve and apply law that was recognizably
English for their own limited polity, was regularized by their absorption
into the new colony. The British king had finally done what he had
indicated was his intention in 1719 when the Board of Trade instructed
Governor Philipps to follow the Virginia instructions of 1715, while
enjoining him "not to take upon you to enact any laws till his Majesty
shall have appointed an assembly and given you directions for your
proceedings therein."40
Early Nova Scotia gained a certain notoriety among the British
colonies in the eighteenth century for its dilatoriness in giving effect to
the direction in Cornwallis' commission to summon a legislative assem-
bly. Governors Hopson and Lawrence were no less resistant. These
first three governors were soldiers, and Professor Webb's thesis has
applicability here. It is a matter of conventional wisdom that the first
legislative assembly for Nova Scotia, which convened 2 October 1758-
over nine years after the settlers arrived in Chebucto-and passed thirty-
six Acts, was largely the result of persistent pressure from a Board of
Trade imbued with Whiggish purism, agitation by the growing New
England merchant community in Halifax, and finally Chief Justice
Jonathan Belcher's belated conversion to legislative probity.41 The
thirty-six statutes promulgated in the first session constituted a record
number of Acts passed in a single session in the province until the
1820-1821 session. They were a flood loosed to quench a thirst.
They are an impressive collection. Only a common lawyer's
prudence prevents one from calling them a "code."42 This is not the
place, nor do we have the time, to analyze in detail the work of that first
session of Nova Scotia's legislature. But the statutes tell us much about
the province's perception of legal needs and, therefore, much about
40. Labaree, supra, note 21, §136.
41. W. MacNutt, The Atlantic Provinces: The Emergence of Colonial Society, 1712-1857
(Toronto, 1965), pp. 57-60 [hereinafter MacNutt].
42. My reservations about using the term "code" for enactments in the common law'
tradition are set down in The Book of the General Lawes and Libertyes Concerning
the Inhabitants of the Massachusets [1648], ed. T. Barnes (San Marino, 1975), Intro.
p. 7 [hereinafter Laws & Liberties Mass.].
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reception. Six statutes dealt with property, real and personal, among
other things putting into full force the Statute of Frauds (1677).43 What
we would call family law was bounded out by three statutes, on
matrimony, divorce, incest, adultery, and polygamy, on guardianship of
minors, and on bastardy. 44 One Act established the Church of England,
allowed Protestant dissent, and provided in a rather benign way for the
"suppression of Popery. '45 Two statutes, one for treason and felonies
and the other for misdemeanours, together constituted a relatively
comprehensive measure for the repression of serious crime.46 A number
of the Acts were directed against vice, disorder, and commercial
malfeasance; these essentially regulatory laws were akin to English
penal statutes and similarly enforceable by common information.47
Interestingly enough, some of these Acts regularized as law previous
ordinances by proclamation issued by Cornwallis and his successors
from the first settlement repressing such disorders.48 One Act provided
for limitations in time for civil actions to the end of avoiding suits at law;
it provides a fairly concise, though probably not all-inclusive, indication
of what actions were common in the colony's litigation at the time.
49
Another Act sought to encourage husbandry and the fishery by bounties
and premiums. 50 Three statutes dealt with finances and taxation.5' One
Act was clearly in furtherance of imperial concerns: to prevent harbour-
ing or assisting navy deserters. 52 Five statutes were institutional in
nature, providing inter alia for a militia, a harbour lighthouse, a house
of correction, and allowances for collectors of impost and excise.
53
Finally, four important Acts regularized prior governmental activity.
Three of them, the second amending the first Act, and the third
"amending and explaining" the other two, were passed confirming
previous proceedings of the courts of judicature and regulating future
proceedings of the same.54 The fourth Act revived and put in full force
43. The Statutes at Large... Nova Scotia, R.J. Uniacke ed. (Halifax, 1805) 32 Geo. 2, cc.
2, 3, 11, 14, 15, 18 [hereinafter Statutes at Large, N.S.].
44. Statutes at Large, N.S., 32 Geo. 2, cc. 17, 19, 26.
45. Id., c. 5.
46. Id., cc. 13, 20.
47. Id., cc. 4, 10, 16, 21, 23, 25, 28, 32, 35.
48. Id., c. 4, prohibiting distilleries within a quarter-mile of Halifax, compare to resolu-
tion of I1 July 1751, Akins, supra, note 2, p. 643;c.20,s. 15, criminal libel and slander
and spreading false news, compare to resolution of 16 February 1751, Akins, id., p.
639; c. 23, prohibiting persons leaving the province without a pass, compare to
resolution of 16 December 1749, Akins, id., p. 597; c. 32, for observance of the Lord's
Day, compare to resolution of 12 September 1750, Akins, id., p. 623.
49. Statutes at Large, N.S., 32 Geo. 2, c. 24.
50. Id., c. 31.
51. Id., cc. 1, 7, 33.
52. Id., c. 11.
53. Id., cc. 6, 8, 9, 22, 34.
54. Id., cc. 27, 29, 36.
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"several of the Resolutions or Acts of His Majesty's Governors and
Council of this Province heretofore made."55
One is hard put to find in these first statutes any foreign source for
them other than the law of England. Only one of them, that for limita-
tions of actions, bears enough resemblance to the statutes of another
colony-in this case, Massachusetts 56-to raise much possibility that
there was any large borrowing from the principal colonies to the south,
Massachusetts, New York, or Virginia. Virtually all of them dealing with
criminal law, including most of the regulatory penal statutes, and civil
law seem based firmly on English statute and common law. One of the
penal statutes, 32 Geo. 2, c. 4, prohibiting erection of distilleries within a
quarter-mile of the Halifax town pickets, was based upon a resolution of
the governor and council in July 1751 prohibiting distilleries within the
picket lines; in promulgating it then the governor and council had
referred explicitly to having consulted the "Laws of the other
Colonies. '57 Yet none of the laws are slavish copyings of the English
books. There is an admirable economy in the number of capital felonies
compared to the mother country, where by the end of the century there
would be about two hundred capital crimes. Here, perhaps, is the
strongest case for a Massachusetts influence on the early statutes,
because since at least 1648 the number of capital crimes in the Bay
Colony was rigidly curtailed.58
Most of the first statutes of Nova Scotia evidently met the standard
of non-repugnancy and agreeableness, and were sufficient for the
moment for the colony's needs. The two Acts that did not meet the
standard and were, in whole or in part, nullified by the king in council
were in areas of law outside the run of criminal and civil enactments. The
clause in 32 Geo. 2, c. 17, establishing desertion and non-maintenance
55. Id., c. 30.
56. Compare Statutes at Large, N.S., 32 Geo. 2, c. 24, An Act for Limitations of Actions,
and for Avoiding Suits of Law, with Acts and Laws of the Province of Massachusetts
Bay (Boston, 1742), 13 Geo. 2, c. 3, An Act for Limitation ofActions and for Avoiding
Suits in Law where the Matter is of Long Standing (1739). Nova Scotia and
Massachusetts differed considerably on the terms for limitations, and the 1758 Nova
Scotia statute limited to twenty years a right of entry, with a saving proviso, s. 3, for
minors, femes covert, mental incompetents, prisoners, and those overseas to enter ten
years after becoming able to enter, etc. The proviso in s. 3 was based on a number of
English cases and the English statute 4 & 5 Anne, c. 16, according to Uniacke's
marginal note.
57. Akins, supra, note 2, p. 643.
58. Laws & Liberties Mass., Text p. 5, "Capital Lawes." A recent, both revisionist and
radical, interpretation of the death penalty in eighteenth century England provides
interesting new insights into the subject: D. Hay, P. Linebaugh, J. Rule, E.
Thompson, C. Winslow, eds., Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-
Century England (Longon, 1975). A necessary corrective to the new view is J.
Langbein's review of it, "Albion's Fatal Flaws," (February 1983), 98 Past & Present
96.
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for three years as a ground for divorce was nullified probably because it
was in direct conflict with and contradictory of the grounds for divorce
mensa et thoro which alone was allowed under English canon law
governing matrimonial matters. 59 An Act for establishing the rate of
Spanish Dollars, and the interest on money in the Province, 32 Geo. 2,
c. 7, was nullified in toto, one suspects because its fixing of the Spanish
Dollar at 5 shillings was in direct breach of the 6 shilling rate set by 6
Anne, c. 57, the 1707 imperial statute establishing the official value of
the empire's coinage. 60 Clearly, the colonists' legal baggage was English
and overwhelmingly unexceptionable and conventional, if plain and
homespun. Only when the colonists tried fancy dress-(grass)widow's
weeds and a coat sequined with Spanish silver pieces-of-eight-were
they turned away at the door back home!
We can reasonably ask how Cornwallis, Hopson, and Lawrence
managed to do justice during the long initial drought before the conven-
ing of a legislative assembly to give Nova Scotia its own law. The answer
depends in part on what they did injudication-and in part on what they
did not do in legislation. To take up the latter point first, these governors
worked with genuine devotion and assiduity to institute an acceptable
and workable civil polity, to preserve public peace, and to advance the
colony's commonweal. Their reluctance to convene an assembly,
apparently more pronounced and more strenuously held by Charles
Lawrence than by his two predecessors, grew from the exigencies of a
new settlement. It was stalked by the real threat of Indians, growing
suspicion of the reliability of the "neutral French" (Acadians), and the
continuing bellicosity of the French at Louisburg and in Canada. The
population was in a state of flux, with many of the original Chebucto
settlers leaving, their places taken by indigent Irish bondsmen fleeing
Newfoundland and Virginia, by a growing cohort of New Englanders,
by merchants, sailors, artisans, and by drafts of sullen and even
mutinous Palatine Germans and Swiss. Save for the latter's beachhead
on the south shore, there was no substantial settlement outside Halifax.
In 1750 Halifax's population was almost 5,000; five years later it was
some 1,500, too many of them newcomers and non-Britishers, most of
them still dependent upon public maintenance from Britain. They were
a turbulent and heterogeneous lot. Out of such sorry stuff the "General
Assemblys of the Freeholders and Planters" enjoined in Cornwallis'
commission could hardly be fashioned. 61 The reluctance of the early
governors to trust the legislative to what appeared to be-and some-
59. Acts of the Privy Council, Colonial Series, vol. 4 (London, 1911), p. 557, disallowing
part of s. 7 of Statutes at Large, N.S., 32 Geo. 2, c. 17, 16 March 1763.
60. Acts of the Privy Council, Colonial Series (London, 1911), p. 808, 30April 1761. See
J. McCusker, Money and Exchange in Europe and America, 1600-1775: A Hand-
book (Chapel Hill, 1978), pp. 125-131, 231.
61. Akins, supra, note 2, p. 499.
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times truly was-a mob is understandable. The early governors did not
govern with much of a consensus, and certainly with a declining one
once the New Englanders became shrill proponents of an assembly.
Still, they governed as well as the situation in which they found
themselves would allow, as well as the circumstances of those they
governed would permit. And they governed by English law.
First of all, they established courts. The governor and council, as
the high court of general jurisdiction for the trial of serious offences and
important civil actions, and as the court of special jurisdiction in equity
and admiralty and matrimonial matters, was the first court to essay
existence. The second court came with the appointment of the first four
justices of the peace in Halifax in July 1749.62 In December following, a
committee of three councillors recommended that the practice in the
Virginia general court and county courts be followed in Nova Scotia's
governor and council and courts of inferior jurisdiction, respectively. 63
By implementing this report the governor and council also assumed an
appellate jurisdiction in criminal and civil cases. For the early years of
the colony the Virginia model in all its detail was somewhat too sophis-
ticated and, consequently, not always followed. However, one by-
product of the imitation of Virginia's courts was the inclination of the
Halifax authorities to look to Virginia law for models for substantive
rules dealing with the problems presented by colonial circumstances.
Early on, the question arose whether settlers at Chebucto could be
pursued in Nova Scotia courts for debts contracted in Britain or other
colonies. The governor and council noted that it was the general custom
in the colonies not to allow a debt to be pleaded in the colonial court
against settlers unless contracted for goods imported into the colony,
and that a check of the Acts of the Virginia Assembly found this to be the
"standing Law of that Colony."64 While the Virginia practice was duly
considered, Cornwallis and the council provided a more limited protec-
tion to Nova Scotia settlers from being impleaded in foreign debt.
Virginia practice insofar as the courts were concerned was also changed
in some substantial points under the influence of the growing contingent
of New Englanders, who had emphatic notions of what constituted
justice and conceived of the jury as a popular institution serving as a
counterpoise to executive power. Still, the Virginia model survived and
the doing of justice in Nova Scotia grew up to it.
62. Akins, id., p. 571.
63. The report is given in extenso in C. Townshend, History of the Court of Chancery in
Nova Scotia (Toronto, 1900), pp. 19-24 [hereinafter Townshend].
64. Akins, supra, note 2, p. 599. Virginia statute 18 (Car. 1), c. 24 (1643) established no
impleading of foreign debts, was confirmed and asserted to have been in continuous
force by Virginia statute 15 Car. 2, c. 10 (1663), and the latter was included in the
printed laws of that colony of 1733, Statutes at Large... Virginia, vol. 2, ed. W.
Hening (New York, 1823), p. 189.
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Secondly, the early governors made the courts work. The first
murder trial, of Peter Carsal, mariner and settler, for the stabbing of
Abraham Goodside, boatswain of the transport Beaufort, which took
place before the governor and council on 31 August 1749, was almost a
showpiece performance. Clearly, it was intended to be that as much as a
means to punishment. The indictment was meticulous (right out of a
formulary book). The grand jurymen were as substantial as the colony
could provide. The verdict was just, judgment pronounced as required
in law, and sentence of death by hanging executed after a suitable
passage of time to allow the governor to consider whether or not he
would exercise the prerogative of mercy.65 The Board of Trade was
suitably impressed, writing to Cornwallis on 16 October 1749,
Your method of proceeding in the trial of Peter Cartell for murder
was very regular and proper, and will have a good effect, as it will
convince the settlers of the intention of conforming to the Laws and
Constitution of the Mother Country in every point.
66
If in the next few years such majestic due process in criminal trials
appears to have eroded, the cause of the decline is in part explicable by
the diminution in the quality of veniremen in an increasingly hetero-
geneous population.
67
Thirdly, the governor and council made laws. Or perhaps, we
should say, they made ordinances, termed "resolutions." Such resolu-
tions were usually expressed in the form of proclamation. Prohibition of
the cutting down of trees within the town was promulgated by
proclamation.68 Even more significantly, proclamations against fore-
stalling markets, selling fresh fish at exhorbitant prices, and retailing
liquor without a licence imposed penalties of fine and/or forfeiture, and
in the latter two instances provided for enforcement by informers who
65. Townshend, supra, note 63, pp. 11-12, prints the indictment in R. v. Carsal (or
Cartel). That indictment, and other parts of the record of the trial, were on a leaf of
the judgment book, Public Archives of Nova Scotia, RG. 39, J, v. 117, since excized.
The petty jury (listed in the MS. judgment book) was comprised of a navy mate, a
midshipman, a surgeon, a schoolmaster, two mariners, two civilian artisans, three
husbandmen, and one unknown. All eleven known jurors were settlers, most of them
were married, none had come on the same ship as the defendant though one of the
husbandmen had come on the vessel of which the victim was a crewman. Prima facie, a
balanced and impartial jury. See also Akins, supra, note 2, pp. 554, 579-580, 585.
66. Akins, id., p. 590.
67. MacNutt, supra, note 41, p. 55. MacNutt relied heavily for his evidence of jury
partiality and the New Englanders' "introduction of the Massachusetts system of
inferior courts in which they entrenched themselves" on An Account of the Present
State of Nova Scotia, in Two Letters to a Noble Lord (London, 1756). These two
anonymous tracts deserve a thorough investigation and testing against the extant
records of the courts in the Public Archives of Nova Scotia.
68. Akins, supra, note 2, p. 595, 6 November 1749.
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would have the benefit of the penalty. 69 The inhabitants were enjoined
by proclamation under pain of fine or imprisonment to assist the
magistrates in the execution of their duties. 70
So far were the governor and council prepared to use proclamation
that the infamous Black Act (1723) of Old England came to Nova Scotia
by that means: anyone convicted of stealing or destroying "Oxen, Cows,
Sheep, Goats, Hogs or Fowls shall be punished according to the utmost
rigor of the Laws of England." 7' Indeed, in this proclamation is the key
to the governor's and councils' use of that device virtually to make law.
The English courts had held that if a proclamation declared existing law,
it was effectual in compelling observance of that law. By proclaiming
that the rigour of English law against cattle wounding, a felony by
statute of 1723, would be exacted, Cornwallis and his council were
merely implementing the law of England. The governor and council
deemed that law appropriate to the maintenance of order in Nova Scotia
and gave effect to it by proclaiming the fact. The resolutions and
proclamations of the governor and council before the establishment of
the legislative assembly constituted a "reception" of English law.
The subsequent legislative history of Nova Scotia's Black Act
proclamation points to how far resolution-proclamation made lasting
law. The first comprehensive felony statute of 1758 did not make
destroying cattle a crime, though stealing cattle would come under
section 22 of the Act and therefore be non-capital petty larceny.7 2 In
1768 a statute made killing, maiming, wounding, or otherwise hurting
horses, sheep, or other cattle a tort for which treble damages could be
recovered by suit in any court of record in the province by action of
trespass upon the case. 73 Though such statutory provisions were much
less rigorous than the law obtaining in England, or conceivably the law
that had obtained in Nova Scotia under the proclamation, the legisla-
ture had accepted the importance of repressing such wrongs. Much
more proclamation "law" found statutory affirmation in the early
legislative history of the colony, a contribution of the practice of the
69. Akins, id., p. 629, 19 November 1750; p. 640, 27 May 1715; p. 624, 11 October 1750.
70. Id., p. 595.
71. Id. The most complete treatment from a socio-criminological historical approach,
though not a legal historical one, of the Black Act's origins and implementation is E.
Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act (New York, 1975). The
major distinction between the Nova Scotia resolution-proclamation and the Black
Act was that the defendants' being disguised was an essential ingredient of the crime in
most cases under the latter.
72. Statutes at Large, N.S., 32 Geo. 2, c. 13. Section 21 oftheAct, makingfelonywithout
benefit of clergy maliciously shooting at a person or sending an unsigned or ficti-
tiously signed letter to extort money or other thing of value, was taken directly from a
provision of the imperial Black Act, 9 Geo. 1, c. 22 (1723).
73. 8 Geo. 3, c. 11 (1768, N.S.).
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courts given vigour by executive proclamation during the first decade of
Nova Scotia's existence.
By governing according to the forms of law in adjudication, the
early governors did substantial justice. Due process was observed by
courts composed almost entirely of laymen. Those courts implemented
as much of the law of England, statute and common law, as the governor
and council by resolution and proclamation felt necessary to the
colony's well-being. In civil matters, what law and how much law was to
be received from the mother country was largely determined by the
demands of the litigants and the intellectual capacities of a lay judiciary
grappling with much very abstruse doctrine and even more contorted
procedure. There is always a danger of underestimating the abilities of
eighteenth century laymen doing law; there is also a danger of over-
estimating the demand for sophisticated law in a new society. The
vocational spread of the first settlers at Chebucto in 1749 is revealing. 74
There were thirty-four "health professionals," including twenty
surgeons and two midwives; that is, one for every 112 settlers. There
were eight wig makers-and about eighty men in the colony of such.
social eminence as to sport a peruke-thus giving one for each ten
prospective clients! Lawyers? There was no barrister-at-law from the
Inns of Court (that distinction appears to have come with Chief Justice
Belcher, called by the Middle Temple in 1734).75 There were two
attorneys: Daniel Wood and John Duport. The latter was quite literally
taken into court with his appointment as one of the first four justices of
the peace. Among the rest of the early settlers there were as many as a
half-dozen clerical men who might have had some training in law, not to
the level of a professional qualification as attorney or solicitor, perhaps,
but who at least would have been able to advise on procedural matters in
the courts and, in the well-established custom of the day, would have
been available to parties to do so. 76 Until there was a sufficient demand
for the services of professional lawyers, especially in civil litigation, the
new colony was well enough served by its lay benches and clerical
advisers (learned or not).
All this seems familiar. It is. For what we observe in early Halifax is
a situation and a development almost indistinguishable from early
74. Compiled from Akins, supra, note 2, pp. 506-557; list of settlers who came with
Governor Cornwallis to Chebucto, June 1749.
75. Register ofAdmissions... to the Middle Temple, ed. H. Sturgess (London, 1949), p.
309. Belcher was admitted 14 March 1730 and called 24 May 1734.
76. William Nisbett, governor's clerk to Cornwallis, and Thomas Walker, who was not
listed among the original arrivals but might have been in the governor's "suite" aboard
H.M.S. Sphinx, were appointed the first notaries public in September 1750, Akins,
supra, note 2, p. 624. Thomas Gray, Archibald Hinchelwood, and John Kerrwere also
governor's clerks, and Rumboll Whitehead was listed as a "clerk" in the first draft of
settlers.
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Boston in the 1630s. For Halifax's "governor and council" read Boston's
"general court." For the former's "resolutions and proclamations" read
the latter's "general orders." As the few legally trained Halifax settlers
quickly moved into positions of administrative and judicial authority,
so did the early lawyers in the Massachusetts Bay Colony. 77 The
parallels are clear but should not be limned too finely. Some years ago
that eminent Nova Scotia historian, Peter Waite, reminded the
neophyte historian that "Governments do not make society so much as
society makes them." 78 For well over a century before Cornwallis came
to Chebucto, Massachusetts society had been hard at work making
Massachusetts government. The society and the government of
Massachusetts Bay in the 1630s was vastly different from that of
Chebucto Bay in the 1750s. Moreover, there was little necessary cause-
and-effect relationship between the Old Commonwealth and the New
Province worked by virtue of the growing Massachusetts contingent in
Nova Scotia or even because of the long intertwining of Massachusetts'
interests and fortunes with those of Nova Scotia. Rather, there was at
work in both places a century and a quarter apart the same process of
sorting out legal baggage, by which much was jettisoned, and that which
was not eased the ultimate process of "reception." But in the meantime,
until the old-Englishman (Irishman, German, New Englander, Acadian,
etc.)-become-new-Nova-Scotian was able to legislate for himself,
sorting out the legal baggage was neither so frenzied nor so thorough as
to deny him the Englishman's legal birthright, "as near as may be
agreeable to the laws of England."
77. T. Barnes, "Law and Liberty (and Order) in Early Massachusetts," in The English
Legal System: Carryover to the Colonies (Los Angeles, 1975), p. 63 at 78-79. The first
professionally-trained (as a solicitor) practicer in Massachusetts was Thomas
Lechford, 1638-1641-and he was alone.
78. P. Waite, ed., Canadian Historical Document Series: Pre-Confederation, vol. 2
(Scarborough, 1965), p. xi.

